Post by Laura Cunningham on Mar 19, 2016 19:57:26 GMT
Brophy, Jessica E.
2010 Developing a Corporeal Cyberfeminism: Beyond Cyberutopia. New Media & Society 12(6): 929-945.
This article attempts to reconcile the early technofeminist binary concepts of virtual and physical worlds tied into the concept of a cyberutopia. She advocates for a version of cyber feminism that "rejects 'leaving the
body behind' while simultaneously reject a cyberfeminism based on
viewing the medium as a simple extension of the body." (2010: 930). Rather than leaving their bodies when online, humans are mediated at all times by their physical situations. This makes the act of getting online a practice in agency for both the individual as well as the technology in use. She closes her article with a discussion of ways future theorists can further eliminate this unnecessary binary.
Brophy includes a discussion of feminism online, hearkening back to earlier texts, that claims the anonymity of online participation can free individuals (i.e. women) of their socio-cultural backgrounds (2010: 930). This allows women a more expression of self than the pre-Internet days, according to Morahan-Martin. Van Zoonen also suggested that the internet becomes a "playground" to experiment with the concepts and symbols that tie gender to individuals, an "escape from the dichotomy of gender and the boundaries produced by physical bodies (van Zoonen, 2002: 12 as quoted by author, 2010: 931).
Brophy dismisses the concept of anonymity by reminding readers that "the seduction of thinking of cyberspace as [homogenous] belies the reality of daily lived experiences outside of cyberspace." (2010: 293). Users never fully give-up their off-line identities. They are always necessarily bound to preconceived notions and behavior patterns which can actually "reify and enact stereotypes, thereby reinforcing the normative understandings of gender, sexuality, race or ethnicity." (2010: 932). Shef further argues that by attempting to remove a user's distinguishing facets, everyone on the internet becomes a homogenous entity, defaulting to the dominant social group: the white, Christian (at least in the United States), male. Lisa Nakamura called this reversion "default whiteness" (2010: 932).
This makes the very idea of cyberutopia self-negating. It excludes those who do not have access, those who do not have the technical or cultural knowledge to successfully navigate the web and other various new media platforms, and those that are not physically capable of physically performing the tasks required to engage other users (2010: 933). Brophy says,
This makes the the very idea of cyberutopia self-negating. It excludes those who do not have access, those who do not have the technical or cultural knowledge to successfully navigate the web and other various new media platforms, and those that are not physically capable of physically performing the tasks required to engage other users (2010: 933). Brophy says,
Brophy's solution to the problematic theory of a homogenous internet community and mind/body dualism is the application of agency (the belief that all humans have free will to make choices) to both internet users and the technology that allow them to connect to the web. For humans, it allows us to interact freely with the world around us, as we choose. She ties this concept to the Saphir-Whorf hypothesis which states that our language will determine our worldview. If we accept the hypothesis, our agency can be characterized by the language we use and react to online. Most linguists today do not fully accept the Hypothesis, precisely because it is too deterministic, but most if not all can accept a softer version that is mediated by culture and socio-economic status of individuals.
Humans can then be considered to be agents that will interact with other agents; causality plays a much larger part in her argument than determinism:
Our experience of ‘reality’ then, is not ‘composed of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena’ but rather is made up of an ‘ongoing flow of agency through which “part” of the world makes itself differentially intelligible to another “part” of the world and through which local causal structures, boundaries, and properties are stabilized and destabilized’ (2010: 937).
If we understand the interaction of humans and the internet as a play between two agents acting upon each other in a causal fashion, we are reminded of the great media guru Marshall McLuhan who once noted, “We shape our tools, and thereafter our tools shape us.” Brophy extrapolates on this statement: rather than bodies as fixed points that can be left behind instead, it "is an intra-agential phenomenon, limited and enabled by the intra-agential phenomena of space and time, as well as other agential phenomena." (2010: 940).
The last concept Brophy discussed was that of liminality. We've talked a little bit about liminality in class, primarily Holly discussing rites of passage vis-a-vis Victor Turner. Brophy also evokes Turner but suggests the very act of participating online creates a liminal event. While online we are both physically in one place as well as traveling everywhere our message is. This is a space where self-representation expands far beyond the very real, lived physicality of face-to-face interactions. To achieve this state of being, we must necessarily operate in conjunction with the technology that allows for wi-fi connection, extending our agency into the objects that we use. In many ways, Brophy's argument is cyclical with earlier theorists and the possible creation of a cyborg. Within the liminal zone, we are neither entirely human nor entirely machine (digital).
In closing, the author suggests that future studies on cyberfeminism should focus on this concept of blended consciousness and address the ways a user's specific physical form interacts with not only the technology they use but the other humans they encounter in online spaces. These encounters are performances "in which both the agency of the user and the apparatus come into play, as well as the agencies of other users." (2010: 944).
2010 Developing a Corporeal Cyberfeminism: Beyond Cyberutopia. New Media & Society 12(6): 929-945.
This article attempts to reconcile the early technofeminist binary concepts of virtual and physical worlds tied into the concept of a cyberutopia. She advocates for a version of cyber feminism that "rejects 'leaving the
body behind' while simultaneously reject a cyberfeminism based on
viewing the medium as a simple extension of the body." (2010: 930). Rather than leaving their bodies when online, humans are mediated at all times by their physical situations. This makes the act of getting online a practice in agency for both the individual as well as the technology in use. She closes her article with a discussion of ways future theorists can further eliminate this unnecessary binary.
Brophy includes a discussion of feminism online, hearkening back to earlier texts, that claims the anonymity of online participation can free individuals (i.e. women) of their socio-cultural backgrounds (2010: 930). This allows women a more expression of self than the pre-Internet days, according to Morahan-Martin. Van Zoonen also suggested that the internet becomes a "playground" to experiment with the concepts and symbols that tie gender to individuals, an "escape from the dichotomy of gender and the boundaries produced by physical bodies (van Zoonen, 2002: 12 as quoted by author, 2010: 931).
Brophy dismisses the concept of anonymity by reminding readers that "the seduction of thinking of cyberspace as [homogenous] belies the reality of daily lived experiences outside of cyberspace." (2010: 293). Users never fully give-up their off-line identities. They are always necessarily bound to preconceived notions and behavior patterns which can actually "reify and enact stereotypes, thereby reinforcing the normative understandings of gender, sexuality, race or ethnicity." (2010: 932). Shef further argues that by attempting to remove a user's distinguishing facets, everyone on the internet becomes a homogenous entity, defaulting to the dominant social group: the white, Christian (at least in the United States), male. Lisa Nakamura called this reversion "default whiteness" (2010: 932).
This makes the very idea of cyberutopia self-negating. It excludes those who do not have access, those who do not have the technical or cultural knowledge to successfully navigate the web and other various new media platforms, and those that are not physically capable of physically performing the tasks required to engage other users (2010: 933). Brophy says,
This makes the the very idea of cyberutopia self-negating. It excludes those who do not have access, those who do not have the technical or cultural knowledge to successfully navigate the web and other various new media platforms, and those that are not physically capable of physically performing the tasks required to engage other users (2010: 933). Brophy says,
In sum, a simplistic egalitarian ideal of cybertopia necessitates disembodiment, denies the situated and lived experiences of individuals, and reinforces the mind/body dualism (Brophy 2010: 933).
Humans can then be considered to be agents that will interact with other agents; causality plays a much larger part in her argument than determinism:
Our experience of ‘reality’ then, is not ‘composed of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena’ but rather is made up of an ‘ongoing flow of agency through which “part” of the world makes itself differentially intelligible to another “part” of the world and through which local causal structures, boundaries, and properties are stabilized and destabilized’ (2010: 937).
If we understand the interaction of humans and the internet as a play between two agents acting upon each other in a causal fashion, we are reminded of the great media guru Marshall McLuhan who once noted, “We shape our tools, and thereafter our tools shape us.” Brophy extrapolates on this statement: rather than bodies as fixed points that can be left behind instead, it "is an intra-agential phenomenon, limited and enabled by the intra-agential phenomena of space and time, as well as other agential phenomena." (2010: 940).
The last concept Brophy discussed was that of liminality. We've talked a little bit about liminality in class, primarily Holly discussing rites of passage vis-a-vis Victor Turner. Brophy also evokes Turner but suggests the very act of participating online creates a liminal event. While online we are both physically in one place as well as traveling everywhere our message is. This is a space where self-representation expands far beyond the very real, lived physicality of face-to-face interactions. To achieve this state of being, we must necessarily operate in conjunction with the technology that allows for wi-fi connection, extending our agency into the objects that we use. In many ways, Brophy's argument is cyclical with earlier theorists and the possible creation of a cyborg. Within the liminal zone, we are neither entirely human nor entirely machine (digital).
In closing, the author suggests that future studies on cyberfeminism should focus on this concept of blended consciousness and address the ways a user's specific physical form interacts with not only the technology they use but the other humans they encounter in online spaces. These encounters are performances "in which both the agency of the user and the apparatus come into play, as well as the agencies of other users." (2010: 944).
